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Teacher union chief Albert Shanker is urging education leaders to 
join him in an effort to create a tough new national exam for entry 
to the profession.  Asked  if  the test was  really a way  to help his 
members get higher pay and status, Shanker said: “I confess (it is). 
And you might also get the same quality and standards that go with 
(professionalism) .” 
Associated Press, 16 April 1985 
As this statement by the leader of the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT) suggests,  teachers unions  seek to increase the quality of the 
educational system as well as to raise the earnings of its members. Are 
they successful in improving the quality of education? How important 
is occupational  licensure as  a tool for improving the quality of education 
and raising  wages  compared to collective  bargaining  and  the other 
activities of public sector unions? 
To  answer these questions we will examine in this paper the extent 
to which unionism leads to stronger licensing statutes for teachers, and 
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alters teacher wages and student test scores directly and through pro- 
visions to license schoolteachers. We  analyze the experience of U.S. 
states from 1972-82-a  decade when school enrollments and the de- 
mand for teachers declined (Murnane 1985). This decline led  to in- 
creased teacher layoffs, fewer opportunities to move  across school 
districts, fewer transfers to better schools, and a decline in teachers’ 
real earnings of over 10 percent (O’Neil  1984). As a consequence of 
these developments, entrance into the profession  was reduced: the 
number of students graduating with education degrees declined from 
177,000 in 1971 to 101,000 in 1982, and the number meeting minimum 
licensing requirements fell from 317,254 in 1971-72 to 140,639 in 1980-81. 
Further, the number of first-year college students planning to choose 
teaching as an occupation fell from 19.3 percent to 4.7 percent (Con- 
dition of Education  1983). 
Comparing states with greater and lesser unionization we find that 
collective bargaining  coverage is associated with  higher  salaries for 
public school teachers and generally, though not uniformly, higher ed- 
ucational  performance as measured by  student test scores and high 
graduation rates. Fixed-effects analysis of the effects of unionism on 
teacher wages and student performance yield greatly reduced estimated 
effects of unionism on wages but continue to show substantial teacher 
union impacts on student performance. We  also find that unionization 
and licensure are complementary for schoolteachers in the sense that 
more heavily unionized states have more stringent licensing laws. With 
collective bargaining held fixed, however, we find no impact for rigid 
licensing statutes on pay and uncertain effects on student achievement 
scores. Hence, licensure does not appear to be an important route by 
which teacher unionism affects the education marketplace. 
We present our analysis in three stages. First, we briefly review past 
findings on the relation between teacher unionism, licensure, and wage 
and educational performance outcomes. Then we describe our data and 
present our empirical results. Finally, we offer a general interpretation, 
with caveats, of our findings. 
11.1  Past  Work 
There exists a substantial literature on the impact of teacher unions 
on wages, but relatively little analysis of the role of licensing provisions 
as an intervening route for the union wage effect or of the impact of 
teacher unions on the output of the educational system. As a prelude 
to our analysis it will be useful to briefly review past findings on the 
issues of concern. 
With respect to the effect of teacher unions on pay there is a wide 
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which ranges from states and school districts to individual teachers, 
and differs in the period of time covered (see the summary in Freeman 
1986). From the late 1960s through the early 1970s studies using state- 
level data showed a range of estimates from 2 percent to 9 percent for 
the impact  of  teachers unions  on pay  (Kaspar 1970; Brown  1975). 
Studies that used the school district as the level of analysis estimated 
effects that varied from  1 percent (Landon and Baird  1971) to 12-14 
percent (Schmenner 1973). Analyses for the 1980s covering districts 
and individuals suggest a greater impact of unions on wages. For ex- 
ample, Baugh and Stone (1982) find union wage effects that range from 
12 to 21  percent. Apparently, for reasons having to do  with changes in 
union  power and in  conditions  in  the teaching  market (union wage 
effects are often larger in declining rather than booming markets (Lewis 
1963)), the impact of unions on wages appears to have increased for 
teachers in the period covered by our study. 
In contrast to the well-documented impact of unions on wages, past 
studies have not systematically analyzed the relation between unionism 
and licensure or between licensure and wages. Much of the theoretical 
literature on the effect of  licensing treats its impact on societal welfare, 
with ambiguous results (Leland 1980), rather than directly addressing 
its effect on wages or performance. In this framework licensing is seen 
as a means to protect the public from an inability to judge the quality 
of services delivered by specialists, given that it is unlikely that spe- 
cialists will  act strictly in  the interest of  the consumer (Jensen and 
Meckling  1976; Williamson  1964). At the same time, however, it is to 
the advantage of teachers (as well as other groups) to use licensing to 
limit supply and extract economic rents (Stigler 1975). In the education 
market the fact that governments employ teachers as well as  determine 
licensing laws creates further complexities, as it is not in the govern- 
ment’s interest to restrict supply and drive up costs. Given these con- 
siderations, we expect licensing laws for teachers to affect the teachers 
market in two ways: assuring the meeting of minimum quality standards 
that improve performance (Ehrenberg  1973; Frey  1975) and  raising 
wages by limiting supply. 
Relatively few studies have examined the impact of teacher unionism 
or licensing on student performance. To  the extent that unions  raise 
the quality  of  teaching  through  licensing,  improve the operation of 
schools  by forcing administrators  to behave more efficiently, or improve 
the quality of teachers by creating professional standards and reducing 
turnover, unions will have positive effects on the productivity  of the 
educational system, as has been found to occur in some parts of man- 
ufacturing (Freeman and Medoff 1984). To the extent that unions simply 
reduce teacher resources by raising costs, they are likely to have the 
opposite impact. We  are aware of only two studies that provide em- 308  Morris M. KleinedDaniel L. Petree 
pirical evidence on which of these effects dominates. Eberts and Stone 
(1986) use test scores on 14,000 fourth graders in selected school dis- 
tricts to evaluate the impact of unionization on performance and find 
that when other socioeconomic factors are controlled for, scores are 7 
percent higher in union districts. In a study published after the work 
for this paper  was  completed,  Kurth  reports the  opposite result:  a 
negative relation between union strength and SAT scores across states 
and time. This finding, however, appears to be due to the absence of 
any trend  or regional controls in the regressions, in  contrast  to the 
work that we report in  this paper. As for the impact of licensing on 
student performance, we do not know of  any studies. The few studies 
that have attempted to examine the impact of  licensing on output in 
other fields, such as dentistry (Holen 1978) or medical and legal spe- 
cialties (Carroll and Gaston 1981), find no systematic relation between 
licensing provisions and performance, suggesting that it is not easy to 
uncover a licensing productivity relation, if one exists. 
In sum, while existing work provides us with reasonable expectations 
about the wage effects of teaching unions, the other issues under study- 
the impact of unions on licensure and the impact of unions and licensing 
on performance-are  rarely  explored, with existing  studies yielding 
uncertain results. It is this “hole”  in the literature that motivates our 
study. 
11.2  Data and Analysis 
To estimate the impact of teacher unionism on wages, licensing laws, 
and  student  performance we  have  obtained  state-level data for the 
1972-82  period. We  chose states as units of  observation for four rea- 
sons. First, licensing of public school teachers in the United States is 
implemented on a state-by-state basis, so that states are the natural 
unit for studying licensure. Second, we have reasonably good data on 
unionization and collective bargaining coverage at the state level for 
the entire period. Third, we are able to obtain student test scores by 
states for the period, providing us with a critical outcome variable. 
Fourth, we can use the state data to develop a longitudinal or fixed- 
effects analysis that examines how within-state changes in unionization 
produce changes in the outcomes under study. Recent work in labor 
economics has stressed the importance of checking cross-section find- 
ings with longitudinal data to control for potential unmeasured variables 
that can bias cross-section results (Freeman 1984). 
Table  11.1  lists  the  key  variables  in  our analysis and  gives their 
source, mean,  and  standard  deviation  for all  states in  the  1972-82 
period. Lines 1-3 give the independent variables reflecting unionization 
and licensing. We  use the percent of  teachers who are members of the 309  Unionism and Licensing of  Public School Teachers 







Percent of teachers organized 
Percent of teachers with 
collective bargaining contracts 
State-set licensing statutes 
Dependent Variables 
4. Average state SAT score 
5.  Average state ACT score 
6.  State graduation rate 
7. Average state teacher pay 









Line 1:  NEA membership data obtained from NEA and National Council of State Ed- 
ucation Associations (Washington, D.C.),  Profiles ofState  Associations,  various editions. 
AFT membership provided by the union with confidential computer printout. To get the 
percentage organized, we divided by  the number of teachers in the state. 
Line 2: Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Survey and Census  of Governments, 
various editions. 
Line 3: Obtained by  reading relevant state legal statutes. 
Line 4: Obtained from Educational Testing Service. 
Line 5: Obtained from American College Testing Service. For reasons of confidentiality, 
the ACT tabulated means for us and performed the various regressions reported here. 
Line 6:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S.  Statistical Abstract. 
Line 7:  National Education Association and National Council of  State Education As- 
sociations (Washington, D.C.), Profiles of State Associations, various editions. 
AFT or National  Education Association  (NEA) and  the percent of 
teachers covered by a collective bargaining contract to measure the 
strength of unionism in a state. Because not all teacher union  locals 
bargain collectively it is generally believed that having a contract is a 
more desirable measure (see Lewis, this volume, chap. 6). Still, the 
percent union may reflect the political power of the union in lobbying 
or campaigning  for outcomes, leading us to examine each of  these 
variables in our analysis. To measure the strength of state licensing of 
teachers we use a dummy variable that takes on the value  1 if  state 
statutes make licensing subject to specific kinds of education, experi- 
ence, and a statewide examination. The means and standard deviations 
in table  11.1 show an average across states of 86 percent of teachers 
in the AFT or the NEA with, however, considerable dispersion among 
states; a smaller but still high percentage covered by collective bar- 
gaining of 65 percent; and 45  percent of the states having what we 
categorize as a strong teacher-licensing statute. 310  Morris M. KleinedDaniel L. Petree 
Lines 4-7  relate to our primary  dependent variables:  the average 
earnings of schoolteachers in a state, and the average Scholastic Aptitude 
(SAT) and American College Testing (ACT) scores of students, which 
we obtained from special tabulations of test results from the Educa- 
tional Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey and from the American 
College Testing Service in Iowa City, Iowa. Although only about 27 
percent of high school students take either of these exams, the exams 
are the most widely administered  national measures of  performance 
available (Dynarski 1985). To evaluate the effects of  unionism and li- 
censing on lower educational achievers, we also examine the percent- 
age of  students who graduate from high school. 
In addition to these variables our calculations include diverse con- 
trols for a range of factors that might be expected to affect teacher 
salaries or educational performance across states: real (price-deflated) 
expenditures per student, nonwage expenditures per student; per capita 
personal income; the percentage of  high school graduates in a state; 
the percentage of students attendin:  private schools; the average wage 
in manufacturing; average public school enrollment; the percentage of 
minority students in a state; and the average age and experience (es- 
timated as age - years of schooling - 5 years) of teachers in a state, 
calculated from the Current Population Surveys as a measure of  the 
human capital of teachers in a state, and an indicator of the favorable- 
ness of state labor law toward teacher collective bargaining. ' 
As our analysis covers an eleven-year period (1972-82),  there are 
555  state-by-year observations for most  variables, though there  are 
some missing values for some states and years in several cases. In all 
of  our empirical work we pool the cross sections for the years and 
include year dummy variables to allow for any year effects. In addition, 
in  some calculations we  add  state dummy variables  as independent 
variables,  changing the  structure of  the analysis from  cross-section 
comparisons to a fixed-effects longitudinal design. We  deal first with 
the  relation  between  unionism  and  licensing,  and then  analyze the 
impact of the two variables on outcomes. 
11.2.1  Teacher Unionism and Licensing 
To see whether unionization in a state is associated with stronger or 
weaker licensing laws we estimated a logistic equation linking the pres- 
ence of a strong statewide licensing policy to the proportion of teachers 
who are members of organizations, or to the proportion who are cov- 
ered by  collective bargaining and by  various control variables using 
our complete pooled cross-section data set.* The results of these cal- 
culations reveal the expected positive relation  between  unionization 
and licensing statutes. In our logit analysis of the impact of the extent 
of union membership on statewide licensing statutes, the membership 311  Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers 
variable obtained a positive and significant coefficient of  1.34 with a 
standard error of  .57. This implies that an increase in union density of 
10 percentage points would raise the probability of having a statewide 
statute by about 4 percentage points. In our logit analysis of the impact 
of  the extent of collective bargaining coverage, we obtained a similar 
positive and significant coefficient for that variable: .91 with a standard 
error of .44. These results indicate that in states where teachers unions 
are stronger, legislatures pass more rigorous licensing statutes. This is 
consistent with the Shanker quote with which we began this paper. 
11.2.2  Unionization and Wages Across States 
Given that unionization appears to increase the strength of licensing 
provisions, the next question to investigate is whether licensing and 
unionism affect outcomes. We  consider first their impact  on wages. 
Our wage analysis takes two forms. First, we regress the log of teacher 
pay in a state on the percentage of teachers in a teacher organization 
or on the percentage of teachers covered by collective bargaining, the 
licensing dummy variable, and various controls.  Second, to remove 
the influence of  any persistent state effect over time, we add dummy 
variables for states and thus estimate the impact of the variables in a 
fixed-effects model. Table 11.2 summarizes the results of these regres- 
sions in  terms of  the estimated coefficients on the unionism and  li- 
censing  variables.  The  cross-section  regressions  show  moderate 
unionization effects, which are higher for the collective bargaining cov- 
erage variable than for the union membership variable. The regression 
Table 11.2  Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors for the Effects of 
Unionization on Log of Teacher Wages 
Independent Variables  Cross-Section Analysis  Fixed-Effects Analysis 
Percent members  .04 









Notes: Cross-section regressions include the following control variables: manufacturing 
wage, index of  legal  environment in  the state toward  collective bargaining, age and 
experience of teachers, year dummies, and three-region dummies. Fixed-effect regres- 
sions include the same control variable as the cross-section regressions. The R*  are not 
reported as they are extraordinarily high with the state dummy variables. 312  Morris M. KleinedDaniel L. Petree 
with percentage  union membership also shows a modest  impact for 
licensing laws. However, when we replace membership with collective 
bargaining coverage the coefficient on licensing becomes smaller and 
remains insignificant. The implication is that collective bargaining rather 
than licensing was the means by which teacher unions affected wages 
in the period. Note, finally, that our cross-state results are within the 
same range as the earlier estimates of the effect of teacher unionism 
on pay using states data cited in section  11.1. 
The results of the fixed-effects analysis are more surprising, as they 
show that state dummy variables absorb any union wage effect. This 
does not mean that unionization has no effect on teacher wages, as 
longitudinal  analyses tend  to understate union  wage  effects  due to 
measurement error (Freeman 1984). Rather, it indicates that the lon- 
gitudinal test is in fact a relatively stringent one, as it eliminates all 
cross-state  variation  and  general  time-series  variation  to focus on 
changes within  states over time. The fixed-effects  wage  results  do, 
however, provide us with a measuring rod for assessing ensuing fixed- 
effects  analyses of  the  relation  between  unionism  and  educational 
performance. 
11.2.3 
The most controversial  issue that we address in  this paper is the 
impact of unionism and licensing on the quality of educational perfor- 
mance. Is educational performance better or worse in states with stronger 
teacher unionization and/or licensing than in other states? 
To answer this question we have regressed the average level of the 
SAT and ACT standardized test scores and the proportion of students 
who graduate high school, on the percentage of teachers who are union 
members and the percentage of teachers who are covered by collective 
bargaining and various control variables. These variables include: the 
percent minority in the state (because of the tendency of minorities to 
score lower on standardized tests); the studentkeacher ratio; nonwage 
expenditures per student (to reflect  resources for public  education); 
and the proportion of high  school graduates in the state and the per 
capita income (to reflect the educational  and income background  of 
students). We  exclude measures of  the physical  capital  in  the state 
school  systems because prior  studies have not  shown an impact of 
physical capital on outcomes (Brown and Saks 1975). As before  we 
have calculated  both  cross-section  and fixed-effects  estimates of the 
impact of unionism and licensing on o~tcomes.~ 
Table 11.3 presents the results of our cross-section  analysis. Columns 
1 and 2 record the coefficients and standard errors on the unionization 
and licensing variables when the SAT is the measure of performance, 
columns 3 and 4 treat the ACT test scores, while columns 5 and 6 relate 
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Table 11.3  Coeficients and Standard Errors for the Cross-Section Impact of 
Unionism and Licensing on Student Achievement Scores and 
Graduation Rates 
Dependent  Variables 
SAT  ACT  Graduation Rate 
Independent  Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Percent members  49.09 
(13.66) 
Percent covered by 
contracts 
State licensing  -  20.96 
(4.45) 
R2  .54 
Sample size  490 
.35 
(.25) 
-  .40 
(10.92) 
-  19.75  .33 
(4.49)  (.08) 
.53  .58 





.30  1.25 
(.08)  (.41) 
.63  .56 







Note: All regressions include the following control variables: studentheacher ratios, nonwage 
expenditures per student, percent minority, per capita income, percentage of population who 
are high school graduates, index of the legal environment for collective bargaining, experience 
of teachers. Estimates using selectivity bias controls also were estimated and are available 
from the authors (Murnane et. al.,  1985). 
to state graduation rates. With test scores as the dependent variables, 
the coefficients on union membership are positive and significant. With 
mean values of 951 for the SAT and of 18.8 for the ACT, the coefficients 
imply unionization impacts on the order of 6-8  percent for increases 
in  unionization from 0 to 1  .OO  and elasticities of test scores to union- 
ization of about 0.5 to 0.7. These are of similar magnitude to the impacts 
estimated by Eberts and Stone on individual students (Eberts  and Stone 
1986). By contrast, the coefficients on the percentage of  teachers cov- 
ered by union contracts are insignificant in the SAT calculations and 
smaller and less significant in the ACT calculations than the coefficients 
on the percentage  of  teachers who are union  members. With  state 
graduation rates as the dependent variable,  both union  variables are 
accorded significant positive effects. In sum, the general impression 
from the table is that unionism is associated with better performance 
of the school system, but varies with  the measure of  union  strength 
and outcome. 
The estimated coefficients on our licensing dummy variable, by con- 
trast, present a less  clear pattern.  In  columns  1  and 2  licensing  is 
estimated  to reduce SAT  scores, whereas in  columns  3  and 4 it  is 
estimated to raise them, and in columns 5 and 6 it is estimated to raise 
graduation rates. Given the negative results with the SAT variable, we 
are reluctant to make any firm conclusion about the impact of licensing 
on outcomes. 314  Morris M. KIeinedDaniel  L. Petree 
To test further the impact of unionization and licensing on educational 
outcomes we performed a fixed-effects analysis, adding state dummy 
variables to our regressions. These dummy variables pick up the impact 
of any omitted state factor that has a constant effect on outcomes over 
time. Including them can greatly reduce the estimated effect of inde- 
pendent variables on outcomes, as we saw with our wage analysis. The 
results of these calculations are given in table 11.4, which follows the 
same format as table 1 1.3. The majority of the results here confirm the 
positive effect of teacher unionism on test scores: both the percentage 
of teachers who are union members and the percentage who are covered 
by collective bargaining contracts are estimated to raise test scores, 
with the difference between the coefficients on the two variables con- 
siderably less than in the cross-section regressions. Roughly, unionism 
has a 3 percent impact on performance in these calculations. The results 
with  respect to graduation  rates are more ambiguous, as the union 
membership variable is estimated to have a modest positive effect while 
the collective bargaining variable has a modest negative effect on grad- 
uation. As for licensing, inclusion of the state dummy variables reverses 
the negative relation  between licensing statutes and SAT scores and 
the positive relation between licensing and graduation rates, while leav- 
ing the positive relation between licensing and the ACT scores virtually 
unchanged. As the estimated impact of licensing appears to vary with 
Table 11.4  Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Fixed-Effect Impact of 
Unionism and Licensing on Student Achievement Scores and 
Graduation Rates 
Dependent Variables 
SAT  ACT  Graduation Rate 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Percent members  18.86 
(5.76) 
Percent covered by  27.47 
contracts  (6.92) 
State licensing  4.70  6.33 
(3.60)  (3.57) 
State dummy  yes  Yes 
variables 





.28  .30 
(.08)  (.07) 
yes  yes 
446  446 
1.30 
(.W 
-  .83 
(1.06) 
1.25  -1.18 
(34)  (54) 
yes  Yes 
490  490 
Nore: All  regressions  include the following control variables:  studentkeacher ratios, 
nonwage expenditures per student, percent minority, per capita income, percentage of 
population who are high school graduates, index of the legal environment for collective 
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the outcome measure and estimating technique, we feel that the most 
sensible conclusion is that our evidence is ambiguous on the effect of 
licensing on outcomes. 
11.2.4  Unionism and Educational Process Variables 
To see whether we can delineate, at least in part, some of the ways 
in which unionization may affect outcomes, we examine the relation 
of unionism and licensing to two educational process variables likely 
to play a role in the performance of the system-studentheacher  ratios 
and nonwage expenditures per student-and  between those variables 
and outcomes. Table  11.5 shows the results of the two sets of calcu- 
lations in terms of the estimated impacts of unionization and licensing 
on studentkeacher ratios and on nonwage expenditures per student and 
of those variables on test scores and graduation rates. Columns 1-4 
show that unionization is associated with higher studentkeacher ratios 
and greater nonwage expenditures per student, while licensure is as- 
sociated with lower studentkeacher ratios and has ambiguous effects 
on nonwage expenditures, depending on the unionization measure. The 
impact of unionization on studentheacher ratios  presumably  reflects 
the standard labor demand response to higher union-induced wages: a 
decline in employment. Columns 5-7  show that higher studentkeacher 
ratios are associated with lower test scores and lower graduation rates, 
while nonwage spending per pupil has no noticeable effect on the SAT, 
a positive effect on the ACT, and a negative effect on the graduation 
rate.  Since unionization tends to raise the studentkeacher ratios, the 
implication  is  that unions  reduce rather than  improve  performance 
through  this  route. The ambiguous effects  of  nonwage  spending on 
outcomes also rules out the union effect on this variable as a potential 
route of impact. In short, our state data are not rich enough to enable 
us to determine the educational process variables by which unionism 
improves student test scores and reduces dropout rates among states. 
In order to examine further the impact of unionization and licensing 
on outcomes, and to help us interpret our econometric results, we 
conducted telephone  interviews with union and government officials 
in ten states with varying degrees of teacher unionization, ranging from 
Mississippi, which has long outlawed bargaining, to New York, where 
unionization is strong. The general opinion of these officials was that 
teacher unionism  increases wages  through  political  and bargaining 
means. There were, by contrast, conflicting opinions on the effect of 
teachers unions on educational quality. Our interviews suggested that 
unionized school districts have lower turnover, greater teacher voice 
on the job, and greater standardization of work activity, which might 
contribute positively to productivity. With respect to licensing, some 
respondents suggested that the weak or  ambiguous effects that we have Table 11.5  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Relation of  Unionism and Licensing to “Educational 
Resource Variables’’ and of  the Resource Variables to Outcomes 
Dependent Variables 
NonWage 
StudentReacher  Expenditures Per  Graduation 
Ratio  Student  SAT  ACT  Rate 
~~ 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Percent members 




-  .35 
(. 16) 
StudentiTeacher Ratio 
Non-wage expenditure per pupil 
R2  .53 
93.97 
(52.42) 
1.48  158.41 
(.38)  (40.85) 
-  .33  -  37.38  35.54 
(.16)  (17.07)  (16.81) 
-7.62  -  .04  -  .90 
(1.33)  (.03) 
,001  .0005  -  ,004 
(.012)  (.ow  (.001) 
.54  .54  .53  .55  .47  .58 
Note: All  regressions include the following control variables: percent minority,  relative per capita income, year and regional 
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found are due to differences in the market for schoolteachers across 
states, since state and local  education officials  relax  licensing  con- 
straints in response to the condition of the market. 
11.3  Conclusions 
Our cross-state analysis  suggests that greater teacher unionism is 
associated with better performance of students  across states, consistent 
with  the analysis  of  individual  students by  Eberts and Stone. The 
relatively strong relation between unionism and student performance 
found in the longitudinal analysis, compared to the negligible relation 
between unionism and wages there, is our strongest piece of evidence 
that teacher unionization is in fact a positive factor in education. Our 
inability  to show empirically how  unionization  improved  outcomes, 
and the sensitivity of the cross-section  results to the measure of out- 
comes and unionization represent the major weaknesses in our findings. 
At a minimum, however, our study rejects any claim that unionization 
contributed to the decline in  student achievement scores during the 
1970s and early  1980s. With  respect to licensing, given the modest 
statutes in existence during the period, it is perhaps not surprising that 
we  obtained  ambiguous  effects  in  the  statistical  analysis.  Recent 
strengthening of licensing laws and pressures to increase entry require- 
ments for schoolteachers may  result in greater and more  consistent 
effects of licensure in the future. 
Finally, while our analysis provides  some evidence of the relation 
between unionization and education, there are several important ques- 
tions that we did not address. First, from the perspective of economics, 
what was the effect of teacher unionization on the earnings of graduates 
as opposed to on their  test  scores? Second, how  do licensing  and 
unionization affect students who do not take college entrance exams 
or are on the verge of dropping out? Third, would we obtain similar 
longitudinal  results  with  more disaggregate school district data over 
time to  those reported for states? More evidence on these issues would 
enhance our knowledge of the role of unions in education. 
Notes 
1.  These variables  are  obtained as follows: percent  population graduated 
high school, percent  students  in private  school, per capita income, student/ 
teacher ratio, percent minority students. All are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census Statistical Abstract,  various  editions.  Mean  experience of teachers 
(age - education -  5  years)  is  tabulated  from  annual  Current  Population 318  Morris M. KleinedDaniel L. Petree 
Surveys. The index of labor laws for collective bargaining in education is from 
the NBER Public Sector Law data set. 
2. In these calculations we controlled for: enrollment, percent minority, per 
capita income, nonwage expenditures, the legal environment, the percent  of 
students in private schools, age of  teachers, and year dummies. 
3. These calculations included the same controls as in note 2. 
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COmmeIlt  Randall W.  Eberts and Joe A. Stone 
Kleiner and Petree explore the effects of  teacher unions and teacher 
licensing on various aspects of the operation of public schools: teacher 
wages, allocation of  school resources, and student performance. Al- 
though substantial work has been done on teacher unions and public 
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schools, very little attention has been given to the effect of licensing 
on school effectiveness. The authors argue that both institutions should 
be considered simultaneously since each potentially can raise wages 
and affect student achievement. 
The relationship between teacher collective bargaining and licensing, 
on the one hand, and teacher salaries, on the other, is easy to under- 
stand. Studies of teacher unions  show that collective bargaining  in- 
creases teacher salaries an average of 15 percent. Kleiner and Petree’s 
results for teacher unions support these estimates. However, they find 
no evidence that licensing affects wages. 
The link between unions and licensing, on the one hand, and student 
performance, on the other, is much more subtle. While education takes 
place  primarily  in  the classroom, contract negotiations  and teacher 
certification and licensing are determined at the district or state level. 
For unionization  and  licensing  to affect  student achievement, they 
must enter the classroom. The obvious primary carrier of these effects 
is the teacher. To  register a significant effect, these institutions must 
significantly affect various teacher characteristics and/or basic aspects 
of the classroom environment:  class size; the time teachers spend on 
instruction  and preparation; the age, experience, and educational at- 
tainment of the teaching force; classroom organization; just to name 
a few. 
We  already know something about the effect of unions on student 
achievement from our own work (Eberts and Stone, 1984, Unions and 
Public Schools). Although  our data sets and  methodology  differ  in 
various respects (most importantly, Kleiner and Petree use state-level 
aggregates of student test scores while we use individual student data), 
it is interesting to compare the two sets of results. We find that teachers 
covered by  collective bargaining  face smaller classes; they  find the 
opposite. We  find that teachers represented by  unions are more ex- 
perienced; they find that these teachers are less experienced, although 
their estimates are statistically insignificant. We find that resources are 
diverted away from  school activities not  related  to teacher salaries, 
presumably to finance higher salaries; they find that nonwage expen- 
ditures per student go up. Finally,  we  both  find a  significant union 
productivity gain. However, we may also disagree here as well because 
of the difference in test score measures. By using SAT and ACT test 
scores, Kleiner  and  Petree’s estimates tend  to include  only  above- 
average achievers. Although  we find a 7 percent union  productivity 
gain for the average elementary student, holding constant school re- 
sources and teacher and student characteristics, we find the opposite 
effect for above-average achievers, who are typically the students tak- 
ing SAT and ACT tests. 321  Unionism and Licensing of  Public School Teachers 
Why do our two sets of results differ so substantially? In addition 
to the fact that we use different data sets and look at students  in different 
grades, there are a number of more detailed issues that may contribute 
to the differences. Kleiner and Petree specify a production function for 
student achievement with expenditures per student as an input. This 
equation resembles a short-run, minimum-cost function normalized on 
output rather than a production function. Moreover, without specifying 
a production  function, Kleiner and Petree are unable to account for 
other important educational inputs. 
Another significant difference between the two studies is the level 
of aggregation of the respective data sets. Kleiner and Petree argue 
that the use of aggregate state data on student achievement is appro- 
priate because licensing is a state function and union organization in 
public  schools is strongly conditioned  by  state bargaining  laws. The 
arguments for treating  licensing  and  union  organization  at the state 
level may be correct, but one can use disaggregate data on individual 
students and schools and still also use state licensing variables as ex- 
planatory  variables.  The appropriate level of aggregation for one in- 
dependent  variable  should  not  determine  the  appropriate  level  of 
aggregation for the dependent and other independent variables. 
We  also have concern over several details of the empirical analysis. 
The pooling of time-series and cross-section data in the estimates with 
no attention to dynamics, for example, suggests that licensing, union- 
ization, and  other independent variables  have  immediate  effects  on 
student test scores. In reality, however, these effects are likely to ac- 
cumulate over time and take place over a protracted period. There is 
also the issue of selection bias in the SAT and ACT test scores. These 
tests are taken by only a fraction of students in  each state, and this 
fraction varies substantially from state to state. It is difficult to separate 
the true effect of unionization from the spurious relationship between 
unionization and the students who took the test. Finally, the use of 
uni’on  membership  as a measure of unionization for teachers means 
that some effect of unionization is expected in states with union mem- 
bers but with explicit prohibitions of collective bargaining by teachers. 
Presumably,  such  teachers should  be treated differently than union 
members in states that permit formal collective bargaining. 
In short, many of the differences in results and methodologies can 
be traced to the problem of data collection. It is very difficult to find 
data that meet all the needs of a project of this magnitude. Nonetheless, 
Kleiner and Petree direct our attention to a neglected but  important 
issue: the interaction of teacher unions with the legal structure of the 
industry and their collective influence on the operation of public schools. This Page Intentionally Left Blank